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VIMAR SEGUROSY REASEGUROS V. M/V SKY REEFER: A CHANGE
IN COURSE: COGSA DOES NOT INVALIDATE FOREIGN
ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN MARITIME
by

C. CHRISTINE FAHRENBACK
I. INTRODUCTION
"By the mid-1980s, at least, it had become recognized that arbitration was the normal
way of settlement of international commercial disputes."1

In today's world of trade and commerce, disputes are inevitable, but people want to do
business, not argue about it.2 Disputes can lead to delayed shipments, complaints about
product quality, and claims of party nonperformance.3 Because the issues of contractually
based commercial disputes rarely involve complex legal issues, more parties are choosing
to settle their disputes in the private, informal setting that commercial arbitration
provides.4
In Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer,5 the U.S. Supreme Court
changed its course in its interpretation of the Carriage of Goods Shipping Act 6 (COGSA)
by upholding a foreign arbitration clause.7 While the Court was making an effort to foster
trade and cooperation,8 critics of this decision, which scuttled 28 years of precedent,
suggest that it will have "a significant impact on the shipping industry, where claims of
$15 million or $20 million for damaged cargo . . . are not unusual."9 Presently, however,
attorneys and cargo insurance companies are in disagreement as to the specific
ramifications of the holding.10
In the Court's recent decision to uphold a foreign arbitration clause found in a bill of
lading,11 the majority left no doubt that the United States' role as a trusted partner in
multilateral endeavors, and beneficiary of international accords, is partly dependent upon
the Court interpreting domestic legislation in such a fashion that it does not violate
international agreements.12 As a result of conflicting federal circuit court decisions, the
increasing role of arbitration in international commercial disputes, and the United States'
need to become less paternalistic,13 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether foreign arbitration clauses "lessen a carrier's liability" in a manner that
COGSA prohibits.14 The conflict of this case revolved around the interpretation of
COGSA and The Federal Arbitration Act.15
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the Supreme Court's reasoning in Vimar Seguros Y
Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, and to explore the case's domestic and international
implications. Part II discusses the statutory history of COGSA and the Arbitration Act,
and the lineage of cases preceding the Supreme Court's decision in this case.16 Part III
looks at the specifics of the case, presenting the facts, procedural history, and reasoning
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of the majority and dissent.17 Finally, the Note concludes with an analysis of the Court's
decision to abandon precedent and depart into uncharted waters by upholding the foreign
arbitration clause.18

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
Despite the recent popularity of arbitration procedures in contemporary contract
negotiations,19 the traditional common law disposition toward such alternative dispute
resolution was not favorable.20 In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act 21 in
an effort to reverse centuries of judicial hostility toward contracts that required parties to
arbitrate any future disputes.22
The Arbitration Act was drafted in order to put arbitration agreements on an equal
"footing" with other contracts, which cannot be avoided simply because they are no
longer advantageous.23
By the time Congress passed the Arbitration Act, nearly all the states had passed their
own arbitration statutes, but this legislation had done little more than codify the negative
common law attitude.24 However, a growing dissatisfaction with judges and juries, along
with the increased costs and delays associated with conventional litigation, had
encouraged parties to look be yond traditional litigation for solutions to their contract
disputes.25 Not surprisingly, arbitration began to gather support as an alternative way to
resolve disputes and has become known as one of the more important jurisprudential
developments of the twentieth century.26
Section 2 of the Act provides in part that in any maritime transaction arbitration clauses
contained in a written agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable."27 Courts
have interpreted the Arbitration Act's broad language as evidence of a clear congressional
intent to develop a public policy in favor of arbitration.28 This provision is frequently
cited as one of the most persuasive sections of the statute, and demonstrates Congress'
increasing favoritism towards arbitration.29
Additional evidence of Congressional intent to submit international disputes to arbitration
emerged in 1970 when the United States ratified the United Nations' Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.30 The Convention advocated
and enumerated uniform standards for the enforcement of arbitration agreements and
awards.31 The U.S. ratified the Convention because of the beneficial effects it would
create in foreign commerce for the United States.32
A second result of the United States' accession to the Convention was that arbitration
would be recognized and enforced among all countries who ratified the Convention.33
There is no similar statute for the recognition and enforcement of litigation and
judgments in foreign countries.34 This has important implications in the international
commercial setting.35 The absence of a similar convention for the recognition and
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enforcement of foreign judgments makes arbitration not only attractive, but compelling
for businesses involved in international trade.36 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has
never faced the issue of subordinating COGSA, a long-standing policy protecting U.S.
shippers, in the interest of the Arbitration Act.37
B. The Carriage of Goods Shipping Act (COGSA)
The United States did not attempt to regulate bills of lading until 1893 when it passed the
Harter Act,38 which prohibits exculpatory clauses that relieve or lessen the carrier from
liability.39 Carriers, in exchange for their inability to lessen liability towards shippers,
received a limitation on their liability for specific types of negligence that resulted in
damaged cargo.40 The passage of this act led to the International Convention for
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading,41 and eventually to the 1936
enact ment of COGSA 42 in the United States.43 The Act, adopted with minor changes
from the Hague Rules,44 applies only to the carriage "to or from ports of the United States
in foreign trade."45 Thus, while COGSA governs international bills of lading, the Harter
Act still governs domestic commerce involving the nation's waterways.
The conflict which surrounded forum selection clauses and, specifically foreign
arbitration clauses, focused on the legislative intent behind COGSA section 3(8)'s
"lessening of liability" clause.46 Historically, the courts interpreted section 3(8) broadly to
include not only the explicit obligations and procedures designed to correct abuses by
carriers, but also the procedural enforcement methods.47 Although COGSA, like the
Arbitration Act, resulted from issues of international concern, the United States has stood
alone in its broad interpretation of "lessening liability" to include foreign arbitration
clauses, demonstrating a public policy directed at protecting American shippers.48
However, recent case history suggests that the broad interpretation of COGSA and its
sister statute, the Limitation of Liability Act,49 may be falling subordinate to the
emerging strength of forum selection clauses.50
C. The Case History of the Interpretation of COGSA
Traditionally, federal and admiralty courts were reluctant to divest themselves of
jurisdiction because there was a clause specifying another forum for litigation.51
However, by the mid 1900s federal courts were beginning to accept and enforce such
clauses, although the circuits varied considerably in their degree of enforcement.52 A
conflict had developed primarily between the Second and Fifth Circuits, with the Second
Circuit being more likely than the Fifth Circuit to approve choice of forum clauses.53 The
Second Circuit relied on a "reasonableness test" to approve choice of forum clauses.54
The test was set forth in William H. Muller v. Swedish American Line Ltd,55 despite the
general state of the law disfavoring such clauses.56 Even though a small minority of
courts quickly followed the test set forth in Muller, it was soon overruled.57
The line of cases holding that COGSA's language precludes the enforcement of forum
selection clauses, because they effectively lessen liability, was significantly strengthened
when Indussa Corp. v. S/S Ranborg 58 overruled Muller.59 The Second Circuit Court held
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that COGSA's application to a bill of lading was sufficient to preclude a forum selection
clause from being valid.60 The court further explained that it interpreted the congressional
intent behind COGSA section 3(8) as invalidating any contractual provision in a bill of
lading which would prevent a party from obtaining jurisdiction over a carrier in an
American court, if the party would otherwise be able to obtain jurisdiction based on other
procedural rules.61
It was not until 1972, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on M/S Breman v. Zapata OffShore Co.,62 that American law was substantially brought into accord with the law of
other common law countries in holding that forum selection clauses were generally
enforceable.63 The United States Supreme Court ruled that forum selection clauses were
prima facie valid, unless a party demonstrated that: (1) the contract was induced by
misrepresentation or overwhelming bargaining power;64 (2) enforcement did not meet a
"reasonableness" test which it set forth;65 or (3) enforcement would contravene a strong
public policy of the United States.66 The Court based its decision, in part, on an
awareness of the globalization of the commercial market, which was taking place at the
time of the decision.67 The Majority felt that previous decisions voiding forum selection
clauses reflected a "provincial attitude" towards the fairness of other tribunals.68
The second blow to precedent came in Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines.69 Here, the
Supreme Court extended the "reasonableness" test, expressed in Breman, to contracts
which included boilerplate language printed on the reverse side of a passenger ticket for a
cruise.70 The Court quickly resolved the argument that the parties had not negotiated for
the forum selection clause by relying on a "common sense" approach that suggested
enforcement of such routine form contracts must be possible without showing actual
bargaining.71 The Court also determined that the injured party failed to meet the level of
"inconvenience" necessary to invalidate the clause set forth in Breman.72 Finally, turning
to whether the agreement was statutorily prohibited by the Limitation of Liability Act,73
the Majority held that it did not conflict if the statute was interpreted narrowly.74 Justice
Stevens filed a strong dissent, joined by Justice Marshall.75
Thus, despite its benign attitude toward forum selection clauses, Breman has had
precedential influence in international commercial agreements.76 Since its decision in
Breman, the Supreme Court has supported party autonomy by upholding arbitration
clauses found in commercial contracts.77 The holding in Carnival Cruise Lines extended
Breman holding to parties of unequal bargaining power who were bound to a contract of
adhesion and had no opportunity to negotiate the forum selection clause.78 Despite the
Court's portrayal of Carnival Cruise Lines as a refinement of Breman, it represented a
significant expansion of the principles previously set forth by the Court, and strengthened
the presumption that forum selection clauses are valid and en forceable.79 Therefore,
when Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer was decided, most forum selection
clauses were enforceable unless the protesting party could persuade the court that the
clause was unreasonable or unfair.80

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
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A. The Facts
Plaintiff-petitioner Baccus Associates 81 contracted with Galixie Negoce S.A. 82 for the
purchase of a shipload of Moroccan fruit.83 Baccus then chartered the M/V Sky Reefer,84
a refrigerated cargo ship, to transport the fruit from Morocco to Massachusetts.85 As is
customary in these transactions, Nichero, as the carrier, issued a form bill of lading to
Galixie as shipper and consignee.86 Among the rights and responsibilities set forth in the
bill of lading were arbitration and choice-of-law clauses.87 When the vessel reached
Massachusetts and the hatches were opened, Baccus discovered that thousands of boxes
of oranges were damaged, resulting in over $1 million damages.88 Baccus received
$733,442.90 compensation from Seguros.89
B. Procedural History
Seguros and Baccus brought suit against Maritima and M/V Sky Reefer in the District
Court of Massachusetts.90 Maritima and M/V Sky Reefer moved to stay the action and
compel arbitration in Tokyo, under clause 3 of the bill of lading and section 3 of the
Arbitration Act.91 Petitioner and Baccus opposed the motion, arguing that the arbitration
clause was void under COGSA section 3(8), and that it was a contract of adhesion.92 The
district court rejected both arguments 93 and granted the motion to stay judicial
proceedings, but refused to compel arbitration, believing it premature.94 It also retained
jurisdiction pending arbitration and certified the issue for interlocutory appeal.95
The First Circuit affirmed the order to stay pending arbitration on different reasoning.96
The First Circuit found that COGSA and the Arbitration Act were in conflict and could
only be resolved by determining which one controlled based on two rules of statutory
construction: order of enactment and specificity.97 An appeal was made to the Supreme
Court, and the Court granted certiorari.98
C. U.S. Supreme Court Decision-Opinion of the Majority
The issue before the Court was whether a foreign arbitration clause in a bill of lading is
invalid under COGSA, because it lessens liability in the manner that COGSA prohibits.99
The Supreme Court, in a 7-1 decision,100 held that COGSA does not forbid forum
selection clauses.101 In the majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, the Court
advanced its primary reason for affirming the lower court's decision as one based on a
rule of statutory interpretation, which states "when two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intent to
the contrary, to regard each statute as effective."102 By establishing this rule of
interpretation, the Court was able to give full effect to both statutes.103
The remainder of the opinion addressed the petitioner's arguments to ensure that COGSA
did not nullify foreign arbitration clauses.104 The first argument was that a foreign
arbitration clause lessened liability by increasing transaction costs 105 such as travel,
passports, hotel, and associated expenses to produce witnesses and evidence necessary to
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support the claim.106 The Court struck down this argument and rejected the reasoning of
the leading case for the invalidation of forum selection clauses.107
In rejecting the petitioner's argument, the Court looked to the language of COGSA and
found it only expressly prevents a lessening of specific liabilities, such as hold harmless
clauses or liability arising from negligence, and does not address the separate question of
the means and costs of enforcing that liability.108 Additionally, the Majority supported its
conclusion by citing Carnival Cruise Lines,109 and the goals of the Brussels
Convention,110 which served as the model for COGSA.111 Finally, the Court discussed the
negative political implications that would result from the interpretation of domestic
legislation in such a manner that violated international agreements. Primarily, the Court
was concerned that such an interpretation could result in being unable to gain the benefits
of international accord, and that the United States could fail to have a role as a trusted
partner in multilateral endeavors.112
The second argument the Petitioner advanced was that there was no guarantee that
foreign arbitrators will apply COGSA.113 The Supreme Court declined to address this
argument, dismissing it as "premature."114 Because this was an interlocutory appeal,115 it
had not been established what law the arbitrators would apply, and therefore, if the
petitioner would receive diminished protection.116 The Court, therefore, affirmed the First
Circuit's reservation of judgment on the choice-of-law question.117 From a practical
standpoint, however, this results in the district court acting as a court of appeals to the
plaintiff if there is a misapplication of law which reduces the carrier's obligations to the
cargo owner below the guarantees set forth in COGSA.118
D. Dissenting Opinion
The lone dissenter was Justice Stevens.119 He based his argument on what he called a
"commonsense reading of 'lessening [of ] liability"120 which, he said, must include
anything that lessens the amount of recovery or the likelihood of any recovery at all.121
Supporting his interpretation of the purpose of COGSA section 3(8), Justice Stevens
claimed that 3(8) was enacted in response to carriers' historic tendency to exploit the
unequal bargaining power inherent in bills of lading, and their attempts to immunize
themselves from liability for their fault.122
Justice Stevens reconciled the discord between COGSA and the Arbitration Act by
bringing to the forefront the exclusion clause found in the Arbitration Act, which states
that the arbitration clause "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."123 He expanded
his discussion and gave examples of situations such as mutual mistake, fraud, duress,
impossibility, unconscionability or illegality under a separate federal statute where the
Arbitration Act would fulfill its policy of eliminating the prior hostility to wards
arbitration without imposing the burden of arbitration on the plaintiffs.124 Concluding,
Justice Stevens claimed that the Court's decision "drained [COGSA'S] words of much of
their potency," and "compounds, rather than contains, the Court's unfortunate mistake in
the Carnival Cruise Case."125
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's new reading of the Carriage of Goods Shipping Act enables the
United States to make a bold statement in support of world commercial trade and its
desire to become a trusted partner in the emerging world market.126 The Court repeatedly
used words such as "antique,"127 "provincial"128 and "parochial"129 in explaining how the
Court would appear if it continued to strike down foreign forum selection clauses.130
Clearly, the Court is trying to cast off any negative connotations others may have about
its present attitude toward foreign jurisdictions settling disputes which arise under
domestic law.131
A. Statutory Interpretation 101
"It makes sense to invoke non-policy justifications for deciding cases only when judges
are unable to determine the policy implications of a particular decision, or where the nonpolicy justifications actually serve to advance legitimate public policies . . . ."132 The
Supreme Court engaged the canons of statutory construction to arrive at its result,133
relying primarily on the canon which states that it is the duty of the courts to interpret
statutes in a manner that enables them to coexist with each other, absent clearly defined
congressional intent.134 Accordingly, the Court established its holding as one of simple
statutory interpretation.135 The Court employed this method of interpretation as the basis
for its decision due to the complexities and importance of the decision.136 By invoking
canons of interpretation, the Court is less prone to criticism and accusations of error 137
and avoids having to confront the competing claims within this case.138
The legislative intent, which is the primary outside source to which the Court may look
for statutory meaning under this canon of interpretation, only mentions "prevent[ing]
abuses that were being practiced with damage resulting due to the negotiable character of
the bill of lading."139 The statute's silence towards any procedural limitations, such as
choice-of-forum clauses, enabled the Court to limit the statute to the express substantive
rules which define the carrier's liability,140 rather than limit the procedural mechanisms
for enforcing them.141 By applying this canon of statutory construction, and determining
that there were no clear legislative intentions to the contrary, the Court was able to arrive
at a result which gave full credence to both COGSA and the Arbitration Act, without
having to make a ruling on presently competing policies.142
B. Implications of the Result
The outcome of this case is another example of the Court compelling United States
corporations into the world commercial economy via arbitration whether they are
prepared or not.143 The results of this compulsion are both positive and negative. One
outcome which is of considerable importance is that the United States now interprets its
version of COGSA and the Hague Rules similarly to most other countries by enforcing
the arbitration clause.144 Scholars believe that this is of primary importance because
conflicts of interpretation of the Hague Rules destroy aesthetic symmetry in the legal
order and impose real costs on the commercial system.145
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The Court's decision also recognizes that since the 1967 Second Circuit decision in
Indussa Corp. v. S/S Ranborg,146 "the world commercially has become smaller,"147 and
"less provincial regarding arbitration and . . . judicial proceedings in other places."148 The
Court embraces the belief that international travel, communications, and accessibility
have reached a point in modern society that national borders do not pose a substantial
barrier, and cannot be used to distinguish between domestic and foreign arbitration
clauses.149
Despite the Court's progress into the world commercial market, the negative impact of
this decision resonates harshly at the domestic level, as Justice Stevens advanced in his
dissent.150 The first issue is the unusual disregard for precedent.151 The Court chose a
novel reading of the statute, despite decades of uniform interpretation by both Courts of
Appeals and scholarly commentators that choice-of-forum clauses are unenforceable
against a shipper because it "relieve[s]" or "lessen[s]" the liability of the shipper.152
Federal courts have stated in the past that COGSA "was intended to reduce uncertainty
concerning the responsibilities and liabilities of carriers, the responsibilities and rights of
shippers, and the liabilities of underwriters who insure waterborne cargo."153
By ignoring precedent, the Court strips away the predictability of contract dispute
settlements upon which business people rely.154 However, the demands of public policy
cannot be ignored as a necessary reason for departure.155 The Court's holding
demonstrates that the public policy concerns of furthering the United States' position as a
trusted partner in the world commercial market supersede the role which precedent plays
in the American judiciary system.156 This delicate topic may well explain why the Court
chose to base its decision on statutory construction and interpretation.157
The second implication of this case is the Court's disregard for the "common sense"
reading of COGSA. Although neither the statute itself,158 nor the legislative history,159
provide any express language regarding the degree of protection which COGSA should
provide American shippers, the statute does contain an "umbrella" phrase at the end of
section 3(8) which has been historically interpreted as including contractual provisions
that have the practical effect of lessening the injured party's damage award.160 The
applicable part of COGSA states that parts of a bill of lading which ". . . less[en] such
liability otherwise than as provided in this chapter, shall be null and void and of no
effect."161 John R. Allison, a leading commentator on this subject, has stated that
regardless of the forum, it is hard to see how the holder of a bill of lading does not have
some "lessening of liability" when forced to bring suit in some distant foreign country,
although the difficulty would vary with the circumstances; Canada is not Pakistan.162
However, there must always be some palpable "lessening," for if the choice-of-forum
clause is ever enforced, the result is that the litigant has been dismissed out of the United
States court in which he has chosen to sue.163 On most moderate-sized claims, compelling
the shipper to the foreign forum is a practical immunization of the carrier from
liability.164
The overriding impact of the Court's decision is the bold statement it makes regarding the
increasing emphasis American courts are placing on arbitration, especially in the
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international commercial arena.165 Presently, some scholars believe that the U.S. position
in favor of commercial arbitration is among the strongest and most clearly expressed
domestic public policies.166 In addition to providing a means for dispute resolution,
arbitration is defining new standards of conduct in international business,167 and
enhancing world peace and stability.168 It is also important to recognize that arbitration,
even in the international arena, does not exist completely outside the legal system.169
Additionally, under the Convention, each nation retains the right to deny enforcement of
any award that is adverse to the public policy of that country.170
There are numerous reasons why companies choose to include arbitration clauses in an
international commercial agreement, many of which vary from the reasoning behind
using these clauses in a domestic contract.171 Among the most frequently cited benefits
are enforceability, ability to select arbitrators, selection of language, flexible procedures,
privacy, lower costs, speed, informality, and an increased likelihood of salvaging an
important business relationship.172 Although arbitration has many advantages, the
disadvantages should not go unrecognized. The foremost obstacles include the difficulty
or inability to receive interim relief, a compromised result, limited discovery and lack of
judicial review.173 The decision of the Court in Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V
Sky Reefer supports the federal courts' general intention to promote commercial
arbitration through its broad interpretation of the viability of arbitration clauses.174

V. CONCLUSION
In Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V. Sky Reefer, the United States Supreme
Court invoked a new reading of COGSA and reinforced the recent judicial emphasis on
settling international commercial disputes through arbitration. Although the Court
emphasized that the new reading was merely a result of applying basic canons of
statutory interpretation, the implications of the decision are more vast.
While the new reading of COGSA necessarily reduces the protection once offered to
American shippers, it aligns the U.S. courts' interpretation of the Hague Rules with other
countries that were a party to the international convention. Looking at the growing need
for international uniformity and enforcement of laws, this decision is another important
step for the U.S. in its recent steps toward subordinating domestic interests in favor of
international goals.
Finally, the Court's decision makes another bold statement encouraging arbitration as a
means of resolving international commercial disputes. Because the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards imposes recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards upon all ratifying countries, arbitration is
becoming a safer alternative than the traditional judicial forum for the resolution of
international disputes. Considering recent court judgments, legislative material, and
academic journals, arbitration will continue to entrench itself as an important part of
international commercial contracts.
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1. Klause P. Berger, Party Autonomy in International Economic Arbitration: A
Reappraisal, 4 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 1, 7 (1993) (citing other commentators).
2. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, A GUIDE TO ARBITRATION FOR BUSINESS PEOPLE
(1993), available at 1993 WL 495935, at *1.
3. Id.
4. Id. Generally, the disputes involve an evaluation of the facts and interpretation of the
contract terms. Id.
5. 115 S. Ct. 2322 (1995).
6. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315 (1988). Section 3(8) of COGSA, found at 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 1303(8), states:
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the
carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection
with the goods, arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties or
obligations provided in this section, or lessening such liability otherwise
than as provided in this chapter, shall be null and void and of no effect
(emphasis added).
Id.
7. Vimar Seguros, 115 S. Ct. at 2329.
8. Id. The Majority relied on the principles stated in The Breman v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.
to support its decision. Id. at 2328. The principles included applying COGSA in a fashion
that would give way to modern principles of international commercial practice, and
failing to enforce foreign forum selection clauses had little place in businesses which
were at one time local, but now operate in world markets. The Breman v. Zapata OffShore Co., 92 S. Ct. 1907, 1914 (1972).
9. Dominic Bencivenga, Court Ships Cargo Arbitration Actions Overseas, N.Y.L.J., July
6, 1995, at 5.
10. Id. Specific statements by representatives include: Paul S. Edelman, Partner at
Kreindler & Kreindler, claims it will have "tremendous repercussions . . . because now I
am supposed to arbitrate any cargo problem in [the carrier's home country];" David W.
Martowski, President of Transport Mutual Services, Inc. (insurer of 23 percent of the
world's oceangoing ships for liability), expects "more cases to be settled . . . [and will]
force people to take a much more realistic view of the merits of a case and settle on a
more commercially realistic basis;" Chester D. Hooper, President of the Maritime Law
Association of the United States, believes cargo companies could prevent shipping lines
from including forum provisions because "it's basically a shipper's market," and they
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could conduct business with a different carrier; and Mr. Bilski, of Royal Insurance, fears
that claims will not be heard in a timely manner, and "may cost the American economy
billions of dollars." Id.
11. A bill of lading is "a document evidencing receipt of goods for shipment issued by a
person engaged in the business of transporting or forwarding goods . . . ." U.C.C. § 1201(6). Bills of lading regulate transactions between the carriers and shippers who
transport goods by sea. Id. See GRAND GILMORE & CHARLES BLACK, JR., THE LAW
OF ADMIRALTY § 3-1 (2d ed. 1975); THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND
MARITIME LAW § 9-8 (1987). A common carrier, usually a ship owner or a ship
operator, who accepts different shipments of goods from many different independent
shippers, issues a bill of lading to the shipper as a receipt and contract for the transport of
the goods. Id.
12. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2329 (1995).
This overriding concern cautioned the Court against interpreting COGSA in a manner
which nullified arbitration clauses based on inconvenience to the plaintiff or distrust in
the ability of foreign arbitrators to apply the appropriate law. Id.
13. See generally id. at 2325-30.
14. Id. at 2323. See also Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S/S Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297
(5th Cir. 1958) (holding a forum selection clause to be unenforceable because agreements
in advance of controversy which ousted courts of jurisdiction were contrary to public
policy and unenforceable), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959); William H. Muller &
Co. v. Swedish Am. Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1955) (holding a forum selection
clause enforceable under a quot;reasonableness" test, despite the present law strongly
disfavoring such clauses), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955), rev'd 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
1967).
15. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 -16 (1994) [hereinafter Arbitration Act].
16. See infra notes 19-81 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 82-139 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 140-75 and accompanying text.
19. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (Arbitration Act leaves
no room for discretion); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (all doubts resolved in favor of arbitration); Sherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 507 (1974) (parties are free to decide that a present dispute should be
submitted for arbitration); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 404
(1967) (congressional purpose that arbitration not be delayed).
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20. Rita M. Cain, Commercial Disputes and Compulsory Arbitration, 44 BUS. LAW. 65,
66, (1988); Ludwig Von Zumbusch, Comment, Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims under
German, U.S. and EEC Law: The International Transaction Criterion and Public Policy,
22 TEX. INT'L L.J. 291, 292 (1987). The precise reasons for the common law hostility
toward arbitration are unknown, but is believed to trace back to the English judges'
almost complete reliance on fees from cases for their income. John R. Allison,
Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accommodations
of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. REV. 219, 224 (1986). A second reason often
cited may have been the centuries-long struggle by the early courts for jurisdiction. Id.
For a view of arbitration in its historical context, see F. KELLOR, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1948); Frank D.
Emerson, History of Arbitration Practice and Law, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 155 (1970);
Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1927).
21. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
22. H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924). Mr. Graham's report, from the
House Committee on the Judiciary, stated that "the need for the law [arose] from an
anachronism of our American law." Id. He continued to explain that centuries ago
jealousy in the English courts initiated the judicial hostility toward arbitration. Id. This
jealousy continued for so long that it became "firmly embedded in English common law
and was adopted by American courts." Id. In the Committee's opinion, based on
statements from the Court, "the precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without
legislative enactment." Id. The Arbitration Act goes much farther than simply validating
arbitration clauses. Allison, supra note 20, at 227. It actually mandates the active
involvement of federal courts in implementing the Act's "pro-arbitration" policy. Id.
Examples include the federal district court's requirement to stay litigation on any issue
within the scope of the arbitration clause, and to issue an order compelling arbitration
upon the application of either party. Id. at 227-28. See generally Sherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (parties are free to decide that a present dispute should be
submitted for arbitration).
23. S. REP. NO. 362, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1924). Congress drafted several specific
statements in the Arbitration Act in an effort to accomplish its objectives. First, the Act
makes arbitration provisions included in contracts, and agreed to prior to a dispute,
"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Next, Congress authorized a federal
court to stay litigation if the claims presented are referable to arbitration under the
agreement in writing for such arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988). Additionally, the Act gives
a federal court jurisdiction over a petition by a party to compel arbitration under a
contract in the event another party refuses to arbitrate according to the terms of the
contract. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
24. Allison, supra note 20, at 226. Under early English common law, the courts were
adverse to the idea of non-judicial forums. LON L. FULLER & MELVIN A. EISENBERG,
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BASIC CONTRACT LAW 432-34 (1972). Consequently, arbitration agreements
contravened public policy, because they ousted the courts of jurisdiction and, therefore,
were unenforceable. Id. The rule and attitude came to the United States with the common
law. See generally Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication: A Comparative
Assessment of Its Remedial and Substantive Status in Transnational Commerce, 19 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 33, 39 (1984).
25. Roscoe Pound, Jurisprudence 359 (1959).
26. Allison, supra note 20, at 219. This is demonstrated not only by the enactment of the
Arbitration Act, but also by the subsequent expansive interpretation by the courts. Id.
27. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Section 2 of the Act states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.
Id. The Arbitration Act enables courts to confirm arbitral awards, stay legislation pending
the outcome of arbitration, and enforce domestic arbitration agreements. Id. For
discussions of the Arbitration Act, see Allison, supra note 20, at 373; Cain, supra note
20, at 65.
28. Lauri Newton, Comment, Arbitration and Antitrust: A Leg Up For International
Arbitration, 25 WASHBURN L.J. 536 (1986). Due to the expressed congressional intent,
courts have concluded that the strong public policy in favor of arbitration requires that
such agreements be liberally interpreted and, when in doubt, resolved in favor of
arbitration. Id. Cf. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)
(Arbitration Act leaves no room for discretion); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (all doubts resolved in favor of
arbitration); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 363 U.S. 395, 404 (1967)
(congressional purpose that arbitration not be delayed).
29. Cain, supra note 20, at 66. In addition, Congress empowered federal courts to stay
litigation in certain situations, and to compel arbitration when a party refuses to arbitrate
according to the terms of the contract. Id.
30. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517. The Convention was completed on June 10, 1958, in New
York City, NY. Id. Initially, the U.S. did not ratify the Convention. Id. Early ratifiers
included France, Russia, Morocco, India, Egypt, Czechoslovakia, and the Federal
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Republic of Germany. W. Lawrence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws
and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 10 (1995).
As of April 1994, ninety-six nations had ratified the Convention, making it the
cornerstone upon which the value of international arbitral awards is based. Id. The United
States resisted signing on to the convention due to conflicting domestic policies.
Implementation of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 1970: Hearings on S. 3274 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Relations,
91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970) (statement of Richard D. Kearney, Chairman of the
Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, accompanied by
Herman Marcuse, Department of Justice) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 3274]. The
Convention was amended and codified as an addition to 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1994).
31. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, S.
Exec. Doc. No. 702, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. (1968). The United States' accession to the
Convention established the present public policy limiting narrow judicial interpretations
of the Convention, and encouraging the use of international arbitration agreements. See
generally Hans Harnik, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 31
AM. J. COMP. L. 703 (1983).
32. Hearings on S. 3274, supra note 30.
33. The Convention specifically requires each contracting state to recognize arbitral
awards as binding, and to enforce them according to the rules of the proper territory.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, Article III.
34. Craig, supra note 30, at 2.
35. Id. Because there is no international court for the resolution of private international
disputes, arbitration has become a popular method for the participants of international
commerce to resolve disputes. Id. The process, although not international, is at least
internationalized, in that awards will ordinarily be recognized and enforced among
members of the Convention. Id. See also Nicolas deB. Katzenbach, Business Executives
and Lawyers in International Trade, in SIXTY YEARS OF ICC ARBITRATION: A LOOK
AT THE FUTURE 67, 67-68 (ICC Int'l Court of Arbitration ed., 1984). In international
matters, the existence of predictable commercial results is less than in domestic
agreements. Id. For those who are not experts in international transactions, an
understanding of the advantages of arbitration is a necessity. Id.
36. Craig, supra note 30, at 2.
37. In Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, Judge Friendly, of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, predicted that when the issue of arbitration had to be decided separately from
choice-of-forum clauses for litigation, the Arbitration Act would prevail if there were any
inconsistencies between it and COGSA by virtue of its later reenactment date. 377 F.2d
200, 204 n.4 (2d Cir. 1967).
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38. See ch. 105, 27 Stat. 445 (1893) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 190-196
(1994)). See generally GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 11, at § 3-1; Schoenbaum, supra
note 11, at § 9-8.
39. 46 U.S.C. § 190 (1988). See H.R. REP. NO. 1988, 52d Cong., 1st. Sess. 3 (1982)
(prohibiting carriers from inserting certain provisions into bills of lading which lessen
liability).
40. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 192 (1988); H.R. REP. NO. 1988, supra note 39, at 3
(permitting carriers to insert into bills of lading reasonable exemptions from liability).
41. Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 [hereinafter Hague
Rules]. The United States was the leader of regulatory legislation for bills of lading, but
several British dominions enacted similar laws shortly thereafter. ARNOLD W. KNAUTH,
THE AMERICAN LAW OF OCEAN BILLS OF LADING 118 (4th ed. 1953). In 1924, an
international diplomatic convention was called by Belgium to encourage all maritime
nations to adopt a uniform set of rules, known as the Hague Rules, governing all bills of
lading. Id.
42. Ch. 229, 49 stat. 1207 (1936) (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315 (1988)).
43. See GILMORE & BLACK , supra note 11, at § 3-24. The subsequent adoption of the
Hague Rules by most of the major maritime countries gave shippers and carriers the
assurance that most aspects of bills of lading would receive similar treatment, regardless
of the country. Kenneth M. Klemm, Note, Forum Selection in Maritime Bills of Lading
under COGSA, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 459, 463 (1989).
44. The express changes made in the Hague Rules are minor, but reflect some of the
domestic policy bias in favor of protecting shippers. David Michael Collins, Comment,
Admiralty International Uniformity and the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 60 TUL. L. REV.
165, 174 (1985). Some of the changes include limiting carriers' exemptions from liability
if suffered as a result of reasonable deviation when loading or unloading, during strikes
or lockouts. Id.
45. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1312 (1988). Foreign Trade is defined as "the transportation of
goods between the ports of the United States and ports of foreign countries." Id.
46. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8) (1988) The entire section reads:
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the
carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection
with the goods, arises from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and
obligations provided in this section, or lessening of liability otherwise than
as provided in this chapter shall be null and void and of no effect.
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Id.
47. See Conklin & Garret, Ltd. v. M/V Finnrose, 826 F.2d 1441 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
that a contractual obligation to sue overseas lessens the liability of the carrier); Union Ins.
Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S/S Elikon, 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981) (reversing a district
court on the grounds that it failed to give sufficient weight to the application of COGSA);
Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding jurisdiction clauses
invalid under COGSA); Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S/S Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297
(5th Cir. 1958) (holding agreements in advance of controversy whose purpose is to oust
the courts of jurisdiction are contrary to public policy and unenforceable); General
Motors Overseas Operation v. S/S Goettingen, 225 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
(refusing to enforce forum selection clauses when COGSA applied).
48. Edward P. Gilbert, Comment, We're All In the Same Boat: Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.
v. Shute, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 597, 626 (1992). The general rule in England is that
forum clauses are prima facie valid. Id. Spain, Italy, Mexico, and Cuba also favor these
clauses without much discrimination. Id.Other countries, on the other hand, still favor
choice of forum clauses, but require that neither party have a link to the country
(Germany and Belgium), or, in the converse, that such a clause will not be enforced if
neither party has a connection to the country (Netherlands). See also Michael Sturley,
International Uniform Laws in National Courts: The Influence of Domestic Law in
Conflicts of Interpretation, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 774 (surveying other countries'
interpretation of § 3(8) of the Hague Rules). Conflicts of interpretation are an inherent
result of countries ratifying a unified code of rules. Id. at 732. The court is greatly
influenced by the country's substantive domestic policy when faced with deciding among
multiple interpretations. Id. at 733.
49. 46 U.S.C. app. § 181-196 (1988). The Limitation of Liability Act provides the same
protection to passengers of cruise ships as COGSA does to the owners of cargo being
shipped on cargo ships.
50. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (interpreting the Limitation
of Liability Act narrowly in order to allow the arbitration clause to stand).
51. Bruce Archer Denning, Choice of Forum Clauses in Bills of Lading, 2 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 17 (1970). The early cases date back to 1889, when a New York district court held
a provision void in a charter specifying that a port of discharge would be the only place
where disputes could be settled. Prince Steam-Shipping Co. v. Lehman, 39 F. 704
(S.D.N.Y. 1889). The court stated: "such agreements have repeatedly been held to be
against public policy, and void. The provision being void, it makes no difference which
party seeks to take advantage of it; being void, it is of no avail to either party." Id.
52. See generally Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S/S Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir.
1958) (holding a forum selection clause to be unenforceable because agreements in
advance of controversy which ousted courts of jurisdiction were contrary to public policy
and unenforceable), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959); William H. Muller & Co. v.
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Swedish Am. Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1955) (holding a forum selection clause
enforceable under a "reasonableness" test, despite the present law strongly disfavoring
such clauses), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955), rev'd 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967).
53. C. Andrew Waters, The Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses in Maritime Bills
of Lading: An Update, 15 TUL. MAR. L.J. 29, 31 (1990).
54. The "reasonableness test" emphasized that the forum named in the contract was the
most practical locale in which to litigate, and was, therefore, enforceable. Muller, 224
F.2d at 808.
55. 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955). In Muller, Wm. H. Muller
& Co. was the consignee of a shipment of cocoa beans being transported by the Swedish
American Lines from Sweden to Philadelphia. Id. at 806-07. The vessel was lost at sea.
Id. at 807. Found in the bill of lading was a clause that required any claim against the
carrier to be decided in the Swedish courts. Id. Despite the contention that the forum
selection clause lessened the carrier's liability, the court enforced it based on the fact that
it was reasonable. Id.The Swedish forum was found reasonable because the lost vessel
was Swedish built and owned, all of the crew resided in Sweden, and the majority of the
evidence available was in Sweden. Id. at 807-08.
56. Waters, supra note 53, at 29.
57. See Amicale Indus., Inc. v. S/S Rantun, 259 F. Supp. 534 (D.S.C. 1966) (forum
selection clause reasonable and therefore valid); Aetna Ins. Co. v. The Satrustegi, 171 F.
Supp. 33 (D.P.R. 1959) (forum selection clause neither lessened or relieved carrier of
liability).
58. 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967).
59. Waters, supra note 53, at 35. The holding that COGSA does not preclude forum
selection clauses was no longer binding, regardless of its rationale. Id.
60. Indussa, 377 F. 2d at 202. The court reasoned that if the clause was held valid, any
dispute would be decided in Norway, the country where the carrier had its principal place
of business. Id. at 203-04. The court noted that even if the foreign court applied the
Hague Rules, it might apply them in a manner inconsistent with American tribunals. Id.
61. Id. at 204. Buried in a footnote, Judge Friendly specifically stated that this decision
did not address the question of arbitration. Id. at 204 n.4. In his opinion, an arbitration
would be held valid, because based on the basic canon of statutory interpretation that
when two statutes are inconsistent, the later-enacted statute prevails. Id. The Arbitration
Act was enacted into positive law in 1947, whereas COGSA was enacted in 1936. Id.
62. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). In this case, a deep-sea oil rig belonging to Zapata, an American
corporation, was damaged in a storm in the Gulf of Mexico while being towed to the
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Adriatic Sea by the Breman, which was owned by a German corporation. Id. at 2. As a
result of a severe storm, the rig was damaged and was towed to the nearby Tampa,
Florida port. Id. at 3. The contract submitted to Zapata contained a provision stating that
any dispute arising between the parties would have to be heard before the London Court
of Justice. Id. A Zapata vice president reviewed the contract and made several changes,
but never questioned the choice of forum clause. Id. at 3. Ignoring its contract promise to
litigate any disputes in the English courts, Zapata brought an action in admiralty against
Unterweser, the owner of the Breman, in the United States District Court in Tampa. Id. at
3-4. Unterweser moved for dismissal based on the forum selection clause. Id. at 4.
63. Id. at 10. The U.S. Supreme Court held that forum selection clauses are prima facie
valid, and should be enforced unless the resisting party can show that enforcement is
unreasonable under the circumstances. Id. For a listing of decisions which the Supreme
Court cited supporting the common law countries' approach, see id. at 11 n.12.
64. Id. at 14 n.16. The negotiations had been made between two sophisticated
businessmen familiar with the industry. In their negotiations, several changes had been
requested in the contract, but the choice-of-forum clause had never been questioned.
Considering these facts, the first criteria was not met.
65. Id. at 16. The Court resurrected the reasonableness test from Muller. Although
"reasonable" was never explicitly defined, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Majority,
expressed the view that a claim of serious inconvenience would not render the clause
unreasonable and unenforceable. Id. at 16. This criteria was quickly dismissed because it
was a freely negotiated contract which contemplated the forum at the time of execution.
Id. at 17.
66. Id. at 15. See Boyd v. Grand Trunk W.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263, 265 (1949). The Court
did not have to determine if this clause contravened the public policy set forth in
COGSA, because the facts of the case removed it from the scope of the Act.
67. M/S Breman v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8 (1972). "The barrier of distance
that once tended to confine a business concern to a modest territory no longer does so."
Id. The Court continued by stating that the judicial resistance to the lessening of a court's
power from forum selection clauses no longer had a place in an era where businesses,
which were once local, now operate in world markets. Id. at 12.
68. Id.
69. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). In this case, Mr. and Mrs. Shute, a Washington couple, took a
cruise on the Carnival Cruise Lines, a Florida based cruise line. Id. Included on the back
of the passenger ticket was a clause designating Florida courts as the situs for the
resolution of any disputes. Id. The Shutes boarded in Los Angeles, and while in
international waters, Mrs. Shute slipped on a deck mat where she sustained injuries. Id.
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70. Id. at 591. The pertinent boilerplate language found on "contract page 1" of each
ticket stated in part:
It is agreed by and between the passenger and the Carrier that all disputes
and matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with or incident to
this Contract shall be litigated, if at all, in and before a Court located in the
State of Florida, U.S.A., to the exclusion of the Courts of any other state
or country.
Id. at 587.
71. Id. at 593. The opinion further stated that it would be "unreasonable" to expect that
any cruise line would negotiate the terms of a forum selection clause. Id. The Breman
reasonableness test, discussed supra note 65, was then further refined "to account for the
realities of form . . . contracts." Id. Three factors led the Court to conclude that the clause
was reasonable under the circumstances. First, "the cruise line has a special interest in
limiting the fora in which it potentially could be subject to suit . . . because . . . it is not
unlikely that a mishap on a cruise ship could subject the cruise line to litigation in several
different fora." Id. Second, the clause established a definite forum for litigation and
"dispelled any confusion about where suits arising from contracts must be brought and
defended, sparing litigants time and expense . . . and conserving judicial resources . . . ."
Id. Third, "it stands to reason that passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum
selection clause . . . benefit in the form of reduced fares . . . ." Id. at 594.
72. Id. at 585. The Court held that the Shutes had not met "the heavy burden of proof"
required to have the clause set aside for inconvenience. Id.
73. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-196 (1988).
74. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. 585, 596-97 (1991). The Court, looking to
congressional intent, suggested that the statute had been enacted in response to
passenger-ticket situations which limited the ship owner's liability for negligence. Id. at
596. The Court distinguished the clause at hand from the aim of the statute, because it
still permitted for judicial resolution of the claim, and it did not limit Carnival Cruise
Line's liability for negligence. Id.
75. Id. at 597. Justice Stevens believes that forum selection clauses are "designed to put a
thumb on the carrier's scale of justice." Id. at 598. Considering this analogy, the clause
was invalid under the terms of the Limitation of Vessel Owners Liability Act, which
prevents carriers from expressly limiting ship owners' liability for negligence towards
their passengers. Id.
76. Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure,
25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 51, 56 (1992).
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77. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) (enforcing
arbitration agreement over protest it violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA)); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
(enforcing arbitration despite claims it violated federal securities law); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Solor Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 615 (1985) (upholding arbitration
despite claim that it violated federal antitrust laws).
78. Robert T. Lemon, Recent Supreme Court Decisions in Maritime Law, 5 U.S.F. MAR.
L.J. 1, 126 (1992).
79. Id. at 129.
80. Id. at 134. To have the clause stricken from a contract, the party had to sustain a
"heavy" burden of proof that the forum selection clause was unfair. Id. The Court set
forth, in Breman, that "serious inconvenience" was inadequate to render the clause
unenforceable. M/S Breman v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 16 (1972).
81. Baccus Associates is a New York partnership that distributes fruit at wholesale
throughout the northeastern United States [hereinafter Baccus]. Vimar Seguros Y
Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, No. 91-13345 WF, 1993 WL 137483, at *2 (D. Mass.
Apr. 19, 1993). The case was brought by Baccus' marine cargo insurer Vimar Seguros y
Reaseguros's name.
82. Galixie is a Moroccan fruit distributor [hereinafter Galixie].
83. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, No. 91-13345 WF, 1993 WL
137483, at *2 (D. Mass. Apr. 19, 1993).
84. The Vessel was owned by M.H. Maritima, S.A., a Panamanian company, and timechartered to Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., a Japanese company.
85. Vimar Seguros, 115 S. Ct. at 2325 (1995).
86. Id.
87. Id. Clause 3 of the form was entitled "Governing Law and Arbitration," and provided:
(1) The contract evidenced by or contained in this Bill of Lading shall be
governed by the Japanese law, (2) any dispute arising from this Bill of
Lading shall be referred to arbitration in Tokyo by the Tokyo Maritime
Arbitration Commission (TOMAC) of the Japan Shipping Exchange, Inc.,
in accordance with the rules of TOMAC and any amendment thereto, and
the award given by the arbitrators shall be final and binding on both
parties.
Id.
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88. Id. at 2325.
89. Id. Seguros was Bacchus' marine cargo insurer. Id. As a result, Seguros became
subrogated pro tanto to Bacchus' rights. Id.
90. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, No. 91-13345 WF, 1993 WL
137483, at *1 (D. Mass. Apr. 19, 1993).
91. Id. Section 3 of the Arbitration Act requires courts to stay proceedings pending
arbitration. Id.
92. Id. Section 3(8) prohibits "lessening of liability" by carriers. Id. at *2. Baccus and
Seguros argued that the inconvenience and costs associated with a proceeding in Japan
would lessen liability in a manner which COGSA prohibited. Id. at *1.
93. Id. at *2. The district court looked to another district court opinion with similar facts
for support. Citrus Marketing Board of Israel v. M/V Ecuadorian Reefer, 754 F. Supp.
229 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding that under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Arbitration Act under Mitsubishi, an arbitration clause incorporated into a bill of lading
was enforceable and did not conflict with COGSA). The court was also unpersuaded that
arbitration clauses in bills of lading constitute a contract of adhesion. Id. The court found
evidence suggesting that Bacchus was alert to the issue of arbitration in advance of the
shipment. Id.
94. Id. at *5. The court refused to grant an injunction compelling arbitration until Seguros
outrightly refused to arbitrate. Id. The court was confident that once the Order resolved
the enforceability of the arbitration clause, the party would willingly proceed to
arbitration as described in the bill of lading. Id.
95. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 29 F.3d 727, 728 (1st Cir. 1994).
The controlling question certified by the court was "whether COGSA § 3(8) nullifies an
arbitration clause contained in a bill of lading governed by COGSA." Id.
96. Id. at 732.
97. Id. Because the Arbitration Act was reenacted into positive law in 1947 and COGSA
was enacted in 1936, the Arbitration Act was more recent. Id. Also, the court found that
the Arbitration Act specifically validated arbitration clauses found in bills of lading,
whereas COGSA did not mention arbitration clauses or forum selection clauses. Id. The
court also noted in dicta the emerging strong federal policy favoring arbitration. Id. See
generally Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 (1981)( more recent statute prevails); Northern
Boarder Pipeline Co. v. Jackson County, 512 F. Supp 1261 (D. Minn. 1981) (more
specific statute controls).
98. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 571 (1994).
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99. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2324 (1995).
100. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsberg joined. Justice O'Connor
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion.
Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
101. Id. at 2330. Specifically, the Court held that choice of forum clauses found in bills of
lading "are not invalid under COGSA in all circumstances," leaving room to invalidate
under different facts. Id.
102. Id. at 2326.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 1995 WL 242268, at *12 ( U.S.
Oral Arg. Mar. 20, 1995).
107. Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (1967) (en banc). Since its decision in
1967, the courts of appeals, without exception, have invalidated foreign forum selection
clauses under COGSA § 3(8). Other cases had also extended the holding to foreign
arbitration clauses. Cf. State Establishment for Agric. Prod. Trading v. M/V
Westermunde, 838 F.2d 1576 (11th Cir. 1988).
108. Vimar Seguros, 115 S. Ct. at 2327 (1995).
109. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). Under Carnival Cruise Lines, the Court looked to the forum
selection clause for any indication that it attempted to limit the cruise line's liability. Id. at
596-97. Finding that it did not, the clause was enforced. Id. The clause was upheld
despite arguments that the cost and inconvenience of traveling thousands of miles across
the country lessened or weakened the plaintiffs' ability to recover its losses. Id. at 603.
110. Specifically, the Court was concerned that interpreting COGSA as disparaging the
authority of other forums for dispute resolution was completely contrary to the goals of
the convention. Id. at 2328.
111. Id. In its discussion of the parties to the Convention, the Court stated that sixty-six
countries are now parties to the Convention and none, except the United States, interpret
the meaning to prohibit foreign forum selection clauses. Id.
112. Id. These concerns directly conflict with interpreting COGSA to nullify foreign
arbitration clauses.
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113. Id. at 2329. The petitioners argued that the Japanese version of the Hague Rules
provides the carrier with a defense based on the acts or omissions of the stevedores hired
by the shipper, while COGSA makes non-delegable the carrier's obligation to stow the
goods below. Id.
114. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2329
(1995).
115. An interlocutory appeal is "an appeal of a matter which is not determinable of the
controversy, but which is necessary for a suitable adjudication of the merits." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 815 (6th ed. 1991). Interlocutory appeals are governed by the
Interlocutory Appeals Act, in which section (a) covers appeals of right and section (b)
covers discretionary appeals, which may only be heard upon judicial discretion. 28
U.S.C. § 1292 (1994). Section 1292(b) applies where: (1) the district judge who makes
the interlocutory order is "of the opinion that such an order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion . . . ," and
also believes that an immediate appeal from the order may "[m]aterially advance the
ultimate termination of litigation . . . ;" and (2) the court of appeals then agrees (at its
discretion) to take the case. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has certified, but not yet decided,
what the scope of jurisdiction is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) in an interlocutory
appeal. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 115 S. Ct. 1998 (1995). Presently, courts
disagree whether appellate jurisdiction extends to the entire order from which the appeal
is prosecuted and not limited to the controlling legal issue certified by the lower court.
RICHARD GIVENS, MANUAL OF FEDERAL PRACTICE 645 (4th ed. 1991). For examples
of courts that extend jurisdiction to the entire order, see Swint v. Chambers County
Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 11 (1994); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987);
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 75557 (1986) (court of appeals reviewing district court's ruling on request for preliminary
injunction properly reviewed merits as well); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156,
172-83 (1974) (court of appeals reviewing district court's order allocating costs of class
notification also had jurisdiction to review ruling on methods of notification); Chicago,
R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 578 (1954) (court of appeals reviewing order
granting motion to dismiss properly reviewed order denying opposing party's motion to
remand); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 287 (1940) (court of
appeals reviewing order granting preliminary injunction also had jurisdiction to issue
order denying motions to dismiss); Daily v. National Hockey League, 987 F.2d 172 (3d
Cir. 1993) (where certified question was whether ERISA claim recluded dismissal of
action under Princess Linda doctrine, court was entitled to determine whether Princess
Linda doctrine would apply in any event); In re Cinematronics, 916 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir.
1990) (certified order permitted jury trial in "core" bankruptcy proceeding; court of
appeals could properly consider whether the proceeding was in fact "core" in nature);
Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Tour Travel Enter., 605 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1979). But see
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (scope of appellate review is limited to the
question certified); In re Traffic Ass'n-Eastern R.R., 627 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1980) (court
reluctant to use jurisdiction acquired under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to dispose separately of
an unrelated appeal from a discretionary order). Although the Court refused to respond to
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the "choice of law" issue that the appellant raised, based on the case law, it appears that
this was a discretionary decision, and the Court could have ruled on the issue if it chose.
116. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2329
(1995).
117. Id. at 2330.
118. Id. The District Court retained jurisdiction over the case to ensure that a proper
choice-of-law was made by the arbitrators. Id. However, the arbitrators must first address
the question. Id.
119. Id. at 2331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 2334.
121. Id.
122. Id. Stevens continued to discuss the nature of a bill of lading as a "form document,
prepared by the carrier, who presents it on a take-it-or-leave-it basis," and that there "[i]s
no arms-length negotiation over the bill's terms." Id.
123. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
124. Vimar Seguros, 115 S. Ct. at 2337 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Id. Justice Stevens also had a strong dissent in Carnival Cruise Lines. 499 U.S. 585,
596 (1991).
126. See generally Vimar Seguros, 115 S. Ct. at 2322.
127. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer 1995 WL 242268, *10 (U.S.
Oral Arg. Mar. 20, 1995). During the oral argument, the Court offered its opinion about
the argument the plaintiff was being "dragged around the world," especially when the
plaintiff is a sophisticated marine insurer. Id. The Court described the argument as "a
little bit antique . . . ." Id.
128. Id. at *13. The Court was not interested in hearing arguments from Indussa. Id. In its
opinion, the world has become commercially smaller and less provincial towards
arbitration and even judicial proceedings in other places. Id.
129. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2328
(1995). Using additional language from Breman, the Court stated, "The expansion will
hardly be encouraged if . . . we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be
resolved under laws of our courts." Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol29/iss2/8

24

Fahrenback: COGSA Does Not Invalidate Foreign Arbitration Clauses in Maritime

130. Id.
131. Id. Using language from Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solor Chrysler-Plymouth, the
Court stated "if international arbitral institutions are to take a central place in the
international legal order, national courts need to shake off the old judicial hostility to
arbitration, and also their customary and understandable unwillingness to cede
jurisdiction of a claim arising under domestic law to a foreign transnational tribunal." Id.
132. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and
Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 656 (1992).
133. Vimar Seguros, 115 S. Ct. at 2326. Canons enable the court to draw inferences from
its language, format, and subject matter, especially when judges are faced with
indeterminate statutory language and inconclusive legislative history. Daniel B.
Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction and Its
Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 746 (1992). These rules aid both the court and the
legislature. Id. at 748. From the judiciary's perspective, the canons promote judicial
efficiency and reduce the costs of deciding cases. Id. From the legislature's standpoint,
they serve as "off-the-rack" provisions that spare legislators the time and associated
expenses of anticipating all the possible interpretations of the statute. Id. The problem
arises over which canons the various courts will apply when interpreting statutes. Id. at
749. This problem is reflected in the decisions of the appellate and Supreme Court. Id.
134. Vimar Seguros, 115 S. Ct. at 2326. This popular statutory canon is frequently
invoked when two statutes are in pari materia when there are multiple statutes with the
same subject. See Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1971);
Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 757 (App. D.C.
1960); Miller v. United States, 615 F. Supp 160 (E.D. Ky. 1985). When construing
ambiguous enactments, it is proper to consider acts passed in subsequent sessions, even
where the acts do not refer to one another. See Boston Sand & Gravel v. United States,
278 U.S. 41 (1928); Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286 (1911); Vane v. Newcombe,
132 U.S. 220 (1889).
135. Vimar Seguros, 115 S. Ct. at 2326. For discussion of factors used for statutory
construction, see Frederick J. de Sloovere, Textual Interpretations of Statutes, 11 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 538 (1934), reprinted in 2B SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 315
(5th ed. 1992) (The courts must choose a satisfactory meaning which will bear in view:
(1) the complete judicial process; (2) the justice of the individual case; (3) the
establishment of a fair rule for future cases; (4) the subject matter of the statute; (5) the
interest of society in certainty and predictability; (6) the history of the legislation and
other extrinsic information concerning the conditions surrounding the enactment of the
legislation; (7) the mischief which this statute sought to remedy; and (8) the purpose of
the language of the statute.).
136. Macey & Miller, supra note 132, at 657.
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137. Id. at 658.
138. Id. at 665. Although, on first impression, it appears that the Justices simply do not
want to deal with the complex issues and policies imbedded in this case, it may, instead
be a result of the present contradiction within the U.S. between values. Id. In earlier eras,
when all people could agree on certain values, judges were less likely to ground their
decisions in content-independent justifications, such as the canons of statutory
construction. Id at 666. When such a legal culture contains internal contradictions, it
becomes exceedingly difficult for judges to reconcile the competing claims and avoid
"taking sides" among the competing claims of interest groups. Id.
139. S. REP. NO. 742, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (statement of Sen. White).
140. The statute clearly includes invalidating provisions, such as hold harmless clauses
and express limitations on liability. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8) (1988).
141. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2326
(1995).
142. Id. at 2326. The general presumption that Congress intends to comply with
international law is powerful enough to influence the interpretation of ambiguous statutes
and ambiguous legislative history. Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as
a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1163 (1990).
143. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (enforcing
arbitration despite claims it violated federal securities law); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Solor Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (upholding arbitration despite claim
that it violated federal antitrust laws); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 417 U.S. 506 (1974)
(enforcing arbitration of claims under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act).
144. See Gilbert, supra note 48 at 626; Sturley, supra note 48, at 776-96. There are,
however, some countries that do not recognize foreign forum selection clauses, but have
specific provisions to that effect in their domestic versions of the Hague Rules. See, e.g.,
Sea-Carriage of Goods Act 1924 § 9(2) (Australia).
145. Sturley, supra note 48, at 736. Sturley continues by claiming that a survey of
different national courts reveals how the domestic law of the country plays a major role
in how each court interprets the Hague Rules. Id. As a result of the vast laws throughout
the world, interpretations differ significantly from country to country. Id.
146. 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967). See supra text and accompanying notes 58-61 for
discussion on Indussa.
147. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 1995 WL 242268, at *13.
(U.S. Oral Arg. Mar. 20, 1995). See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Regional Integration
Mechanisms in the Law of the United States: Starting Over, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
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STUD. 155 (1993) (regional trading markets have accelerated the globalization of markets
such as the EC or NAFTA; a natural result of these arrangements is that countries
harmonize or approximate the laws of one another).
148. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 1995 WL 242268, at *13.
(U.S. Oral Arg. Mar. 20, 1995).
149. Id. Justice Stevens' dissent argued that Carnival Cruise could be reconciled with
Vimar Seguros by limiting the enforcement of forum selection clauses to domestic
boundaries. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322,
2335 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Majority pointed out that, for many United
States citizens, many domestic fora are more distant than foreign fora. Id. at 2335 n.13.
150. See generally Vimar Seguros, 115 S. Ct. at 2331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. See generally Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808 (1992) (The rule
of "stare decisis" is not an "inexorable command," and when necessity demands a
departure from precedent, there is not obligation to follow prior decisions; in this case the
U.S Supreme Court set forth questions to help determine the value of precedent
including: (1) whether the central rule of the leading case has been found workable; and
(2) whether the law's growth in the intervening years has left the leading case's rule a
"doctrinal anachronism discounted by society.).
152. Id. at 2332. See Indussa Corporation v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d. 200 (2d Cir. 1967)
(holding jurisdiction clause in bill of lading invalid under COGSA); Carbon Black
Export, Inc. v. The S/S Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958) (holding forum selection
clause unenforceable); M.G. Chem. Corp. v. M/V sun Castor, 1978 AMC 1756 (D.
Alaska 1977) (holding COGSA's application to bills of lading sufficient to preclude
enforcement of a forum selection clause); The Ciano, 58 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1944)
(provision stipulating disputes to be determined in Gijon, Spain, was invalid and against
public policy because it was an attempt to oust federal courts of their jurisdiction);
Kuhnhold v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 251 F. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (holding
provision which limited adjudication of disputes to French court invalid); Prince SteamShipping Co. v. Lehman, 39 F. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1889) (forum selection provisions are
against public policy and void).
153. Union Ins. Soc'y. of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721, 723 (4th Cir. 1981).
154. Cf. Colonial Trust Co. v. Flanagan, 344 Pa. 556 (1942). "The doctrine of 'stare
decisis' is a salutary one, and should not ordinarily be departed from where decision is of
long standing and rights have been acquired under it, unless considerations of public
policy demand it." Id. at 561.
155. Id. at 557.
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156. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2330
(1995).
157. Macey & Miller, supra note 132, at 655. These two authors argue that it makes
sense to use nonpolicy justifications, such as canons of statutory interpretation, to
advance legitimate public policies or when judges are unable to determine the policy
implications of a particular decision. Id.
158. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1316 (1988).
159. S. REP. NO. 742, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
160. See Conklin & Garret, Ltd. v. M/V Finnrose, 826 F.2d 1441 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
that a contractual obligation to sue overseas lessens the liability of the carrier); Union Ins.
Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S/S Elikon, 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981) (reversing a district
court on the basis that it failed to give sufficient weight to the application of COGSA);
Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding jurisdiction clauses
invalid under COGSA); Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S/S Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297
(5th Cir. 1958) (holding agreements in advance of controversy whose purpose is to oust
the courts of jurisdiction are contrary to public policy and unenforceable); General
Motors Overseas Operation v. S/S Goettingen, 225 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
(refusing to enforce forum selection clauses when COGSA applied).
161. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8) (1988).
162. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Breman, COGSA and the Problem of Conflicting
Interpretation, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 365, 368-69 (1973).
163. Id.
164. Id..
165. John R. Allison, Arbitration of Private Antitrust Claims in International Trade: A
Study in the Subordination of National Interests to the Demands of a World Market, 18
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 361, 379 (1986).
166. Id. at 367. Although the Supreme Court supports arbitration of international
disputes, it recognizes that the efficiency and effectiveness of arbitration of some types of
international disputes has yet to be proven. See generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Solor Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (acknowledging that the potential of
arbitration for efficient disposition of legal disagreements arising from commercial
disputes has not been tested); Markham Bell, Dispute Resolution: Controlling the process
in Arbitration, 752 PRAC. L. INST. CORP. L. AND PRAC. HANDBOOK SERIES 285, 287
(1991) (parties that choose to arbitrate improve their chances that an award will be
enforced both in the country which rendered the decision and in other countries where
enforcement may be sought).
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167. Michael R. Voorhees, International Commercial Arbitration and the Arbitrability of
Antitrust Claims: Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 14 N. Ky. L.
Rev. 65, 88 (1987). There are several major trends which are emerging in international
commercial arbitration including: (1) good faith behavior in contracting; (2) arbitration as
an important mechanism for defining right and obligations resulting from new contractual
forms; (3) arbitration as a determination and valuation of damages; (4) determination of
jurisdiction, as no longer limited by formal definitions; (5) the survival of particular
contractual obligations, despite the failure of others; and (6) the importance of arbitration
when contracting with government agencies. Id.
168. Id. at 89.
169. Zumbusch, supra note 20, at 323. Arbitration is based on contract law, which, in
order to be valid and enforceable, must meet the requirements of the particular
jurisdiction. Id. Therefore, the notion that arbitration is separate and independent from the
national legal system is mistaken. Id. This, however, protects the parties from
arbitrariness and other forms of undue influence. Id.
170. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of the Foreign Arbitral
Awards, art. V, para. 2(b), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2520.
171. Allison, supra note 165, at 5. See also Craig, supra note 30, at 7 (in order to get
effective and predictable resolutions in international commerce, arbitration is essential; it
is fair to say that arbitration in international matters is the norm, not the exception).
172. See Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Effective International Commercial Arbitration, 9 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1191, 1194 (1977) (contending that arbitration is informal, quick,
private, convenient, and inexpensive); Daniel M. Kolkey, Dispute Resolution and
International Commercial Agreements, 676 PRAC. L. INST. COM. L. & HANDBOOK
SERIES 527 (1993); Lee Loevinger, Antitrust Issues as Subjects of Arbitration, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1085, 1089 (1969) (proposing three advantages to arbitration: economy,
expertise, and expedition); Steven A. Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, 71
A.B.A.J. 78, 79 (Feb. 1985) (asserting that arbitration is faster, less costly, more private,
more informal, more confidential than litigation); Lawrence Perlman & Steven C.
Nelson, New Approaches to the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes, 17
INT'L LAW 215, 218-25 (1983) (arguing that arbitration minimizes problems of forum
shopping, concurrent jurisdiction, and limited access to pretrial discovery inherent in
international litigation); Armen Vartian, Choice of Confirmation Forum in International
Commercial Arbitration Agreements, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 67, 72 (1985) (when the parties
have agreed to arbitrate, there is little chance that the award will not be enforced; when
the parties have not agreed, the situation is less certain). But see Henry P. de Vries,
International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National Courts, 57
TUL. L. REV. 42, 61 (1982) (arguing that the advantages of speed, time, informality and
economy attributed to domestic arbitration are reversed in the international arena);
Richard Lempert, Companies Seeking Further Alternatives to Litigation Abroad, LEGAL
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TIMES, Mar. 28, 1983, at 1, 8 (noting that international arbitration can be longer and
more expensive than litigation).
173. Kolkey, supra note 172, at 529.
174. Id. at 534. In the Committee's view, the provisions of S. 3274 will serve the best
interests of Americans doing business abroad by encouraging them to submit their
commercial disputes to impartial arbitration for awards which can been enforced in both
the U.S. and foreign courts. H.R. REP. NO. 1181, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess. 2 (1970),
reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601, 3602.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol29/iss2/8

30

